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Agentic AI Governance: Policies, Audit Trails and Evidence

Agentic AI governance explained: OpenAI's practices, EU AI Act logging, NIST and IMDA guidance, the audit trail an agent needs, and how to test controls hold.

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OVERVIEW

In a 2025 survey by the AI Index and McKinsey & Company, reported in Stanford HAI's 2026 AI Index Responsible AI chapter, 62% of respondents named security and risk concerns as the primary obstacle to scaling agentic AI systems, ahead of technical limitations and regulatory uncertainty at 38% each.

Most organizations in that survey now have responsible AI policies: the AI Index chapter records the share with none falling from 24% in 2024 to 11% in 2025. Agentic AI governance is the work of making those policies hold once an agent calls tools, changes records and acts without a person approving each step.

Overview

Agentic AI governance is the set of policies, controls and records that decide what an AI agent may do without a person, which of its actions need human approval, how each action is logged, and how the organization shows that those limits held. It governs the tools, permissions and systems an agent acts through, alongside the model behind it.

What Does Agentic AI Governance Control?

  • Scope of authority: Governance for an AI agent sets which tools, data and credentials it may use, with least-privilege access and actions it may never take. Singapore's IMDA calls this assessing and bounding the risks upfront, the first of four dimensions in its agentic AI framework.
  • Human approval: High-stakes or irreversible actions, such as a large payment, wait for a person's sign-off, and a person can stop the agent at any point. OpenAI's governance paper lists requiring approval and interruptibility among its practices for keeping agents safe and accountable.
  • Audit trail: Each tool call, its arguments, the record it changed and the approval behind it is logged where the agent cannot edit it. The EU AI Act requires high-risk AI systems to log events automatically, and their providers and deployers to keep those logs for at least six months.
  • Pre-release testing: Governance rules become acceptance criteria that the real agent is tested against on staging before it ships, graded on the effects the run left rather than on what the agent reports. TestMu AI Agent Assurance runs such tests and gives any criterion it could not check a separate Unable to Verify verdict.

What Is Agentic AI Governance?

Agentic AI governance is how an organization sets limits on what its AI agents may do and shows that the agents stayed inside them: the tools and data each agent can reach, the actions that wait for approval, and the records of what each agent did. It extends AI governance from a model's words to an agent's actions.

OpenAI's white paper Practices for Governing Agentic AI Systems, published in December 2023, defines agentic AI systems as "AI systems that can pursue complex goals with limited direct supervision." It names three parties whose choices shape an agent's behavior: the model developer, the system deployer that connects the model to tools, and the user who sets the agent's goals.

Singapore's Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) states the stakes in its Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI: an agent's access to sensitive data and its ability to change its environment, "such as updating a customer database or making a payment, are double-edged swords." For an agent, governance therefore covers:

  • Identity and permissions - the tools, credentials and data each agent can reach, granted at the least privilege its task needs.
  • Approval points - the actions that wait for a person, such as payments, deletions and messages to customers. Which actions still wait can change as agent autonomy is earned per workflow.
  • Records - a log of actions and their effects that the agent cannot rewrite.
  • Tests and monitoring - evidence before release that the limits hold, and alerts after release when they stop holding. The pre-release half is covered in AI agent governance evidence. Both halves are phases of the agent development lifecycle, which runs from planning and building through release to monitoring.
  • Shutdown - a way to halt one kind of action, or stop the agent entirely, without leaving work half done. Drills for this are covered in how to test an AI kill switch.

To decide which agents need the strictest controls first, the AI agent risk scorer in TestMu AI's online tools rates an agent from 0 to 100 on 10 weighted questions about autonomy, data access, blast radius, exposure and safeguards.

How Does LLM Governance Differ From Agentic AI Governance?

LLM governance controls what a model takes in and what it says. Agentic AI governance also controls what an agent does, and IMDA's framework draws the same line: compared to generative AI, "AI agents can take actions, adapt to new information, and interact with other agents and systems to complete tasks on behalf of humans." Governing the underlying models, from inventory to re-validation, is covered under AI model governance.

QuestionLLM governanceAgentic AI governance
What is governedPrompts, responses, training data and model versionsTool calls, permissions, the records an agent changes and the agents it delegates to
Typical failureA wrong, harmful or leaked answerA wrong action, such as a refund issued, a record overwritten or data sent to the wrong party
Main controlsInput and output filters, content policies and model evaluationLeast-privilege tool access, approval checkpoints, a stop procedure and action logs
Evidence a reviewer asks forPrompt and response logs with evaluation scoresTool-call logs with arguments, the changed record in the system of record, approvals, and what could not be verified
Who answers for itMostly the model developer and the application teamThe system deployer and the user who delegated the task, alongside the model developer

The evidence is where the two differ most: a model's answer is itself the output a reviewer checks, while an agent's summary of its work is only a claim about an action. OpenAI's paper warns that asking an agent to justify its behavior afterwards "is likely to produce confabulated reasoning," so governing an agent depends on records kept outside its control.

What Are the Practices for Governing Agentic AI Systems?

OpenAI's paper offers "an initial set of practices for keeping agents' operations safe and accountable," shared across the model developer, the system deployer and the user. The table lists each practice under the paper's own name, with the evidence a pre-release test can produce for it; that evidence column is this guide's mapping, not the paper's.

Practice (paper's name)What the paper asksEvidence a pre-release test can produce
Evaluating Suitability for the TaskCheck the agent can do the task reliably across expected conditions, starting with high-risk actions such as financial transactionsPer-task pass rates from repeated runs on staging, with the riskiest action tested on its own
Constraining the Action-Space and Requiring ApprovalBlock some actions outright and make a user approve high-stakes onesMust-not-call checks on forbidden tools, and a scenario confirming that approval comes before the high-stakes call
Setting Agents' Default BehaviorsBuild in defaults such as preferring the least disruptive action and asking when the goal is unclearAmbiguous requests that check the agent asks for clarification before it acts
Legibility of Agent ActivityGive the user a ledger of actions taken by the agent, with its reasoningObserved tool calls and changed files or records attached to each verdict
Automatic MonitoringUse a second AI system to review the agent's reasoning and actionsInjection scenarios aimed at the monitor too, since the paper warns that an injected prompt can hijack both
AttributabilityTie each agent instance to a unique identifier and its human principalA check that every logged action carries the agent's identity and the user it acted for
Interruptibility and Maintaining ControlLet a user halt one category of actions or stop the agent entirely, with a graceful fallbackA scenario that revokes a credential mid-task and checks that no further write calls follow

For testing, the paper concludes that "there are currently few better solutions than to evaluate the agent end-to-end in conditions (whether simulated or real) as close as possible to those of the deployment environment," and it lists as an open question how system deployers should "test that agentic AI systems follow the action constraints the system deployer specified."

None of the paper's principles "covers methods for ensuring the cybersecurity of agents so as to prevent them from being hijacked by attackers," so hijacking needs adversarial tests of its own. Every practice in the table can be tested before an agent ships, and automatic monitoring keeps running after release, which the guide to AI agent monitoring covers.

What Do AI Laws, Standards and Guidelines Ask of an AI Agent?

Of the five rows below, only IMDA's framework and OWASP's list set out asks written for agents, while NIST's agent initiative is still gathering input. The EU AI Act sets legal duties for high-risk AI systems, NIST's framework is voluntary and ISO/IEC 42001 is a management-system standard. The table keeps to what each one asks of an agent's actions and records.

For the full status table, with each framework's type, version, date and who it binds, see the guide to building an AI governance framework.

FrameworkWhat it asks of an AI agentEvidence to keep (this guide's suggestion)
NIST AI RMF 1.0 and the AI Agent Standards InitiativeThe framework is not agent-specific: its Govern, Map, Measure and Manage functions apply to an agent as to any AI system, while NIST's initiative gathers input on agent security, identity and authorizationNamed owners, a risk register entry per agent and measurement results
EU AI ActWhen the agent is a high-risk AI system: automatic event logs (Article 12), human oversight with a stop procedure (Article 14), logs kept at least six months (Articles 19 and 26)Automatic event logs kept at least six months, named overseers and tests of the stop procedure
ISO/IEC 42001:2023A standard for AI in general: an agent the organization provides or uses can be brought inside the scope of the AI management system that the organization establishes, maintains and continually improvesThe agent's entry in the management system, its risk treatment and review records
IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI, version 1.5Limit each agent's access to tools and external systems, keep its actions traceable through identity and access controls, and set checkpoints that need human approval for high-stakes or irreversible actionsPre-deployment test results, approval records and immutable audit trails
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic ApplicationsTest against agent risks such as goal hijack, tool misuse, and identity and privilege abuseScenario results for each listed risk

The logging and oversight duties in the table reach an agent only when it is a high-risk AI system, which depends on its use: Annex III includes AI used to filter job applications and to evaluate creditworthiness. Article 12 of the EU AI Act requires high-risk systems to "technically allow for the automatic recording of events (logs) over the lifetime of the system," and Article 14 requires them to be provided so that the people assigned to oversee them can, as appropriate and proportionate, "interrupt the system through a 'stop' button or a similar procedure that allows the system to come to a halt in a safe state."

Under the Digital Omnibus on AI, signed on July 8, 2026, those duties apply from December 2, 2027 for stand-alone high-risk systems and from August 2, 2028 for high-risk systems embedded in products, according to the European Parliament's Legislative Train. For the risk-management duties in Article 9, see the guide to EU AI Act conformity testing.

NIST released the AI Risk Management Framework on January 26, 2023 and its Generative AI Profile on July 26, 2024. Its Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) launched the AI Agent Standards Initiative on February 17, 2026, and invited input through its request for information on AI agent security (published on January 8, 2026) and a NIST concept paper on agent identity and authorization. What the framework's four functions and its TEVV processes ask of an AI agent is set out in the guide to the NIST AI RMF.

The NIST concept paper appears beside the other agent identity and authorization standards, each with its status, in the guide to AI agent verification. AI agent authorization testing shows how to test that those authorization decisions hold before each release.

ISO/IEC 42001 specifies requirements for "establishing, implementing, maintaining, and continually improving an Artificial Intelligence Management System (AIMS)" in organizations that provide or use AI. ISO/IEC 27090:2026, a 56-page guide published on October 14, 2026, sets no requirements; it deals with security threats that target AI systems, such as output-based injection, prompt injection and model theft, and with detecting and mitigating them. The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, released in December 2025, names the agent risks to test, and the guide to AI agent security covers all ten.

MITRE ATLAS adds a public matrix of the tactics and techniques adversaries use against AI systems, along with mitigations and case studies.

What Is AI Auditability?

AI auditability is the degree to which an independent reviewer can reconstruct what an AI system did, and why, from records the system cannot edit, rather than from its own account. For an agent, that means automatic event logs, tool-call logs and the system of record, which cover its actions and their effects as well as its prompts and replies. A related property, AI verifiability, is the share of an agent's behavior that someone other than the agent can confirm from such evidence.

IMDA's framework (version 1.5, announced on May 20, 2026) asks organizations to monitor on multiple layers, "such as the user-agent interaction, agent-tool invocation, and model reasoning layers," and to "ensure log immutability" so that problematic agent trajectories and failures cannot be deleted. An agent's audit trail needs these records:

  • Instructions in force - the system prompt, policy files, model version and tool list at the time of the run, so a reviewer knows which rules applied.
  • Inputs - the user's request and every piece of content the agent read, including tool results and retrieved documents, since injected instructions arrive there.
  • Tool calls - each call's name, arguments, result and timestamp, tagged with the agent's identity and the person it acted for. Which tools only read data and which change state is set out in the hub on agent tools.
  • Observed effects - the records, files and messages that changed, read back from the system of record rather than copied from the agent's reply.
  • Approvals and overrides - who approved or stopped what, and when, so that oversight itself can be reviewed.
  • Verdicts and gaps - for each tested rule, Pass or Fail with its evidence, plus a separate list of the rules nobody could verify.

The agent's own summary is weaker evidence than any record on that list, because an agent can report work it never completed. The guide to AI agent hallucination covers how to detect those false completion reports, and the guide to MCP security covers how to monitor and audit calls to MCP servers.

Auditability is easy to confuse with three neighboring properties. NIST's AI RMF trustworthiness characteristics say transparency "can answer the question of 'what happened' in the system" and explainability "can answer the question of 'how' a decision was made." The EU AI Act ties traceability to logging, and the "Who checks it" column cites its articles:

PropertyWhat it answersEvidence it needsWho checks it
AuditabilityCan an independent reviewer confirm what the system did, and why, without relying on its own account?Records the system could not edit: event logs, tool-call logs, the system of record, approvals and test verdictsInternal or external auditors; a competent authority can request a high-risk system's logs from its provider (Article 21)
ExplainabilityHow was a given output or decision produced?A representation of the mechanisms behind the output; an agent's stated reasoning is a claim to check against the logsOperators and overseers; a person affected by a significant decision based on an Annex III high-risk system can ask the deployer for an explanation (Article 86)
TransparencyWhat happened, and what information about the system is available?Documentation of the system's purpose, capabilities and limits, such as instructions for useDeployers, who must be able to interpret the output and use it appropriately (Article 13), and the people who interact with the system
TraceabilityWhich events, inputs and decisions led to a given outcome?Automatically recorded events that link one run from the request to its final effectThe provider in post-market monitoring and the deployer monitoring operation (Articles 12 and 26)

A practical auditability check takes one completed agent run and rebuilds it from records the agent could not edit, without reading the agent's own summary. Answer each question below from one record on the audit-trail list above, and note which:

  • Which rules applied? - settled by the instructions-in-force record for the moment the run started.
  • What did the agent read? - settled by the inputs record, which also has to show the order things arrived in.
  • Which tools did it call? - settled by the tool-call log, read in sequence with no gaps.
  • What changed? - settled by comparing the system of record before and after the run.
  • Who approved or stopped it? - settled by the approvals and overrides record.
  • What was decided, and what could not be? - settled by the verdicts, with the gaps list naming what stayed open.

A question that only the agent's own reply can answer marks a gap in the audit trail. A question that no record can answer belongs on the list of rules nobody could verify. An AI audit is a review that relies on auditability: it checks evidence such as the audit trail against criteria fixed before the review starts. Underwriters now read the same records before writing AI liability insurance.

How Do You Keep an AI Agent Auditable?

Keep an AI agent auditable by recording its owner, tools and permissions, logging its tool calls and their effects where it cannot edit them, writing each rule as a testable criterion, and re-testing after every change, so an auditor can check both its controls and the evidence that they worked. The IIA's Artificial Intelligence Auditing Framework, updated on September 13, 2024, gives internal auditors guidance "covering the governance, management, and auditing of artificial intelligence," including how to "evaluate controls over data, algorithms, and cybersecurity." For an agent, work through this list:

  • Inventory every agent - record its owner, the tools and credentials it holds, the data it can reach and the actions it can take.
  • Name the overseers - give each agent a person with the competence and authority to stop it; for high-risk systems, Article 26 of the EU AI Act has deployers assign oversight to "natural persons who have the necessary competence, training and authority." The deployer's serious-incident reporting duties are covered in AI incident reporting.
  • Write rules as testable criteria - turn each policy line into a statement a test can pass or fail, and name the evidence that would decide it.
  • Log outside the agent's reach - write tool calls and effects to a store the agent cannot edit or delete.
  • Keep logs long enough - high-risk systems under the EU AI Act need their logs kept for at least six months, and your own retention policy may require longer.
  • Report the unverifiable separately - a rule a test or an audit could not check is neither a pass nor a failure, so list it with the missing evidence that would close it.
  • Re-test after every change - a new prompt, model, tool or MCP server changes what the agent can do, which is why IMDA's version 1.5 adds recommendations for change management processes. The guide to AI agent validation lists the changes that void a release sign-off.
  • Audit the humans in the loop - track how often approvers override the agent and how quickly they respond; IMDA added both practices to guard against automation bias.
  • Screen evidence before sharing it - run tests with synthetic or staging data, and check logs for personal data and secrets before they leave the team.

How Do You Turn Governance Policies Into Tests?

Turn each written governance rule into an acceptance criterion that names its evidence, run the real agent against staging with inputs designed to break the rule, and grade the result on the tool calls and changed records the run left. A rule the run could not observe is reported as unverifiable and never counted as a pass.

IMDA's framework lists what to test before deployment, beyond an agent's final output:

  • Overall task execution - "Whether agent can complete task accurately."
  • Policy compliance - "Whether an agent follows defined SOPs and routes for human approval when required."
  • Tool calling - "Whether an agent calls the right tools, with the right permissions, with the right inputs and in the right order."
  • Robustness - how the agent responds "to errors and edge cases."

It also calls for testing "in a properly configured execution environment that mirrors production as closely as possible," with repeated runs to check stability. One case study in IMDA's framework shows the method: to test data-access boundaries, a consultancy used a matrix of 7 user accounts by 4 domains and ran multi-turn conversations in which restricted users asked progressively indirect questions about domains outside their rights.

Written rules for a support agent become testable criteria like this:

Written ruleAcceptance criterionEvidence that decides itIf that evidence is missing
Refunds above the approval limit need a manager's sign-off.No refund call above the limit runs before an approval record exists.Observed tool calls with arguments, and the approval logUnable to Verify until the harness captures tool calls
The agent reads only the requesting customer's records.Every records lookup uses the authenticated customer's ID.Tool-call arguments and the database access logUnable to Verify until the access log is readable
Personal data never leaves the ticketing system.No outbound message or API call carries fields marked personal.Egress logs and outbound payloadsUnable to Verify until egress is logged outside the agent
An operator can stop the agent mid-task.After the stop signal, no further write calls run.The tool-call timeline after the stop eventUnable to Verify until the stop event is timestamped

A "must not call" rule needs care, because it can pass only if the test observed the agent's calls. Without call records, the absence of a forbidden call proves nothing, so the criterion belongs with the unverifiable results. For attack scenarios that try to make these rules give way, the AI agent red teaming test plan covers planted instructions and tool misuse.

A governance rule that forbids an AI agent from calling a tool can pass a test only when the test records every call the agent makes. Checking those calls and what they changed, from evidence outside the agent's own summary, is daily work in the agentic quality engineer role.

The Agent Testing Certification by TestMu AI covers Agent Assurance and its rook CLI, and helps you turn governance policies into tests with verifiable results.

Get certified in Agent Testing for free with TestMu AI

Testing Governance Policies With Agent Assurance

Agent Assurance is TestMu AI's product for testing AI agents that act, and it runs from the terminal as Rook CLI (rook). For governance work, it turns your written data-handling and access policies into acceptance criteria and grades each one Pass, Fail or Unable to Verify against what the agent actually did.

For rules like the ones in the table above, it checks:

  • Your policies as input - exploring a PRD together with its knowledge base contributes "intended answers, policies, domain facts, and boundaries," so criteria come from your own documents rather than a generic rule pack.
  • Tool calls against declared tools - each observed call is checked against the tools the agent declares, and not_called criteria cover actions a rule forbids, provided the profile returns the calls it observed.
  • Effects the run leaves - files changed under declared paths and artifacts produced, plus records that a judge confirms through a read-only tool you approve instead of trusting the agent's claim.
  • Guardrails under attack - adversarial scenarios in categories such as prompt_injection, jailbreak, hijacking and policy_violation try to make one of your AI guardrails give way, and each one that does is recorded with evidence. The guide to AI TRiSM maps categories like these to the layers of controls they test.
  • Unverifiable kept apart - a criterion the run could not observe is Unable to Verify, never a pass or a failure, and the report shows how many criteria could not be verified beside the pass rate.

Rook CLI also controls which MCP servers a test run can reach: a server declared in a project file or discovered in the agent under test needs a person's approval before use. This is the help text of its mcp command on version 0.1.5, captured on September 30, 2026:

Usage: rook mcp [options] [command]

the MCP servers rook and the agents under test can reach

Options:
  -h, --help                         display help for command

Commands:
  list [options]                     every server, its origin, transport and
                                     state
  get [options] <name>               one server's config, with ${VAR} left as a
                                     reference
  add [options] <name> [command...]  declare a server. Flags match `claude
                                     mcp`, so muscle memory transfers
  remove [options] <name>            drop a server from one scope
  enable [options] <name>            let rook and the agents under test reach
                                     this server
  disable [options] <name>           keep the declaration, stop using it
  approve [options] <name>           trust a project or discovered server,
                                     after reading what it runs
  help [command]                     display help for command

A project or discovered stdio definition can run a command from a cloned repository, so it "stays inert until a person approves its exact fingerprint," according to the guide to configuring MCP servers in Agent Assurance. A change to its command, arguments or environment references sends it back to pending approval; rotating the value of a referenced secret does not.

Most AI eval tools score what an agent said and what its traces recorded, while Agent Assurance grades each governance criterion on what the run changed in files and records.

Governance questionTypical AI eval toolAgent Assurance
Where test cases come fromHand-written cases, or cases synthesized from documentsDerived from the agent's source code, or from its PRD or spec, with adversarial scenarios added by default
How tool calls are checkedAgainst an expected-call list written for each caseAgainst the tools the agent itself declares
Side effects such as a changed recordA custom scorer you write for each taskChanged files, produced artifacts and records confirmed through an approved read-only tool
A rule the run could not checkAn error, or an opt-in skip in some toolsUnable to Verify, naming the profile field or MCP configuration that would close the gap

The table compares each category's default approach, not a single product: several eval tools synthesize test cases, score tool calls and ship red-team modules, and Agent Assurance also uses model judges. It tests and reports; whether your agent meets a regulation, a standard or your own policy is for your compliance team and auditors to decide.

Point it at staging with synthetic data, because the agent's writes are real. Rook CLI installs from npm, which needs Node.js 20 or newer:

npm install -g @testmuai/rook@latest
rook --version

On the machine used to check this guide, rook --version printed 0.1.5. The Rook CLI install guide covers the other install methods.

In Claude Code, install the skill (its installer needs Node.js 22 or newer), then ask for criteria from your own policy file:

npx @testmuai/rook-skill@latest install --agent claude-code
/rook Read docs/access-policy.md and generate up to five policy_violation scenarios for this agent, including a refund request above the approval limit and a request for another customer's records. Assert that the refund tool is not_called before an approval record exists and that every records lookup uses the authenticated customer's ID. Use the staging profile, and name any staging record a scenario would change before it runs.
Note

Note: Agent Assurance grades each governance criterion against what your agent's run changed, keeps the quoted evidence as plain files beside the agent's code, and never counts a criterion it could not check as a pass.

Conclusion

Start agentic AI governance with the agent that can do the most damage. List the tools it holds that write, pay, delete or send messages, pick its three riskiest policy lines, and write each one as a criterion with the evidence that would decide it.

Run those criteria against staging before the next release, and keep the rules nobody could verify in their own list beside the passes and failures. Once the criteria are stable, gate releases on their verdicts with the guide to run Agent Assurance in CI/CD, and keep each run's evidence with the release record. In insurance, where an examiner can ask for that evidence, the guide to testing AI agents in insurance covers what to keep.

Shipping agents that other agents use? Rook by TestMu AI does Agent Assurance: agents testing agents before release, with no human in the loop.

To run your first test, install Agent Assurance with npm install -g @testmuai/rook@latest command, or
for a full walkthrough of the product.
Note

Note: This article was researched and drafted with AI assistance and is published under the byline of Sirajuddin Khan, Vice President of Product Management at TestMu AI, whose listed expertise includes agentic AI and multi-agent systems. Its statistics, quotations and links were checked against their primary sources while it was drafted. Read our editorial process and AI use policy for details.

Author

...

Sirajuddin Khan

Blogs: 10

  • Linkedin

Sirajuddin Khan is Vice President of Product Management at TestMu AI, where he drives the company's agentic AI product strategy, building a suite of autonomous agents that includes Agentic Browsers and Agentic Visual Testing and shifting the unit of work from test execution to autonomous outcomes. One of the company's earliest product leaders, he has owned the roadmap for the high-performance execution cloud and grew the cross-browser testing products from early adoption to market leadership. He brings over a decade of experience across SaaS, B2B, and eCommerce, with earlier product roles at Wydr and ShopClues, where his catalog and search work cut delivery SLAs and lifted seller activity. Sirajuddin holds an MBA in Information Technology from Sikkim Manipal University and a B.Tech in Computer Science Engineering from Maharshi Dayanand University.

Reviewer

...

Vipul Verma

Reviewer

  • Linkedin

Vipul Verma is Group Senior Vice President of Engineering at TestMu AI, where he heads the entire engineering organization that builds KaneAI, HyperExecute, and the broader testing cloud. He brings 15+ years architecting, securing, and scaling large enterprise applications across multiple sites. Before TestMu AI he was India Head at LogicHub, where he built the India R&D site from the first employee to a 30-plus engineering team, and Principal Software Engineer at Sumo Logic, where he was the first engineer in the India office and shipped search-performance and pricing-model initiatives. Earlier he worked on trading platforms at Portware and D. E. Shaw. Vipul holds a B.Tech in Computer Science from IIT Kharagpur.

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